Many industries are characterized by a small number of firms making many entry decisions over a large choice set. Nowhere is this more true than in the case of the discount retail sector, where Target, Wal-Mart, and Kmart compete in a national market. Traditional discrete choice models of firm entry are ill-suited to this high dimensional choice problem. We instead draw upon recent innovations in the application of maximum score estimators to models of revealed preference (Bajari and Fox (2006), Fox (2007)). Unlike previous work on this sector, our approach allows us to consider any number of potential rivals, any number of stores per location, the endogeneity of the distribution network, and unobserved (to the econometrician) location attributes that might cause firms to cluster their stores. Moreover, we show how recent innovations in set identification and inference can be used to separate the role of these unobservables from observed location attributes like population. We find that all firms (especially Target and Kmart) find it advantageous to cluster stores around distribution centers. Conditional upon that clustering, however, they find it costly to locate their stores in close proximity to one another (i.e., an "own business stealing" effect). All firms (especially Kmart) find it even more costly to locate in close proximity to a rival. Both of these strategic effects are understated if unobservable market attributes are ignored. Using counterfactual simulations, we explore the role of the distribution network in determining the level of retail competition experienced by consumers in markets of varying size. Density economies arising from the distribution network lead consumers in small, isolated markets to be underserved by Target, giving Wal-Mart more market power and the ability to raise prices there.
Introduction
A cursory examination of the size distribution of firms in almost any industry reveals a similar pattern: dominance by a few extremely large players. Large, multinational corporations sell everything from chemicals to coffee. Instead of observing the birth of many new firms as markets grow, we mainly witness the continued growth of a handful of large incumbents. Although game theory provides a rich framework for analyzing strategic interactions between small numbers of players, the complexity of the objective function that such firms maximize is truly daunting. Furthermore, many industries are dominated by as few as two or three firms, begging the question of how one can estimate rich systems of parameters with the observed behavior of so few players. As a result, empirical models of strategic interaction have tended to focus on interactions between very small firms in isolated geographic markets or narrowly defined product categories. 1 While analytically clean, this approach misses important features of modern competition: scale and scope. In this paper, we aim to develop a simple empirical method for tackling such large scale problems.
Our motivating example is the decision by a retail chain of where to locate its stores.
While our empirical analysis will focus on the discount store industry, the same insights apply to almost every area of retail trade. Due to the increasing importance of information technology, distribution systems, and volume purchasing, virtually every retail industry is now dominated by a handful of powerful chains. While a few industries (like supermarkets) still feature some strong regional chains, most retail markets are effectively controlled by just two or three national players. Discount stores are a prominent example, with three national chains accounting for nearly three quarters of total sales. Each of these chains must solve a complex optimization problem: build a network of outlets that moves products to consumers as efficiently as possible, recognizing that their rivals are trying to do the same. While this optimization problem is naturally viewed as a discrete game, it has an extremely complex structure. Firms must choose the optimal design of a vast network of both stores and distribution centers in the face of fierce competition. Moreover, the combination of network and competitive effects implies that spillovers between stores could be either positive or negative. From an estimation standpoint, even if a tractable method for 1 A notable exception is Jia's (2007) model of retail store location, which we will discuss in detail below.
solving an equilibrium were available, the solution would not likely be unique. Nonetheless, we argue that the parameters that govern such complex interactions can be estimated in a relatively simple manner using the logic of revealed preference and the tools of maximum score and set inference.
By relying on a revealed preference argument, we consider a large number of "local" perturbations to the observed network structure that involve swapping pairs of stores owned by rival firms between matched pairs of markets. The structure of these swaps serves two purposes. First, the deviations from the observed equilibrium must be payoff reducing, generating preference inequalities on which we base estimation. This revealed preference structure also eliminates the need to solve for an equilibrium, mitigating concerns over multiplicity of equilibria and greatly reducing the computational burden of the estimation procedure. Second, by considering only matched swaps of rival stores between pairs of markets, these inequalities mimic the structure of a difference-in-differences design, allowing us to eliminate a common, market-level unobservable, which is key for obtaining unbiased estimates of either congestion effects or economies of density. Because we control for the structural error in this way, and because the markets from which stores are swapped are chosen randomly, the revealed preference inequalities satisfy a rank-ordering property and can be estimated using pairwise maximum score.
Intuitively, our estimation strategy exploits the complexity of the decision space to offset the small number of market participants. Even though the number of players is small (in this case three), the number of alternative configurations (and pairwise deviations) is immense, allowing us to exploit asymptotics in the number of choices, rather than the number of agents. However, the small number of players does impose a cost when it comes to recovering and decomposing the fixed effects we have differenced away in the maximum score procedure. Employing another set of inequalities, based this time on the first order conditions from the profit maximization problem, we recover ranges in which these fixed effects can lie, and then project them on additional covariates using set inference techniques developed in Beresteanu and Molinari (2006) . Set identification follows from the limited number of inequalities available given the small number of players observed in this industry.
Our paper builds on and extends a large and growing IO literature on the estimation of discrete games that started with a series of seminal papers by Bresnahan and Reiss (1987 , 1990 , 1991 . In these three companion papers, the authors considered entry by single store firms into isolated geographic markets, quantifying the impact of price competition by identifying the threshold market sizes at which firms choose to enter a given market. Mazzeo (2002) and Seim (2006) extended this analysis to include product and spatial differentiation respectively, but maintained the focus on single unit firms in isolated markets. While Seim (2006) While it would, in principle, be relatively straightforward to extend Holmes' dynamic approach to include strategic interactions using recently developed two-step estimation techniques for dynamic games of incomplete information (Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007)), the importance of network interactions and their essentially national scale casts serious doubt on the assumptions of stationarity that underlie these methods. The growth of the discount chain industry is a fundamentally non-stationary process: Wal-Mart has never exited a market, 2 Kmart hasn't opened a new store in more than six years. While there are signs that the industry has stabilized in the past few years (e.g., Wal-Mart's stock market performance), the previous forty years of data clearly capture the process of moving (expanding) to equilibrium, not the cyclic behavior one would expect to find if the ergodicity assumptions of these current approaches were in fact reasonable.
In some settings (e.g., supermarkets, cement), such non-stationarity can be accommodated by appealing to the existence of multiple, distinct geographic markets or trading areas.
Unfortunately, the big three discount chains operate in a national market (or, at the very 2 While Wal-Mart has not exited markets altogether, it has still closed stores. In December 2002, it had 391 of its store locations up for sale; most of these sales resulted in Wal-Mart closing an older store location and re-opening a modernized store in a nearby shopping center within the same market (Turner, 2003) .
least, one that is hopelessly overlapping on the supply side), making such arguments inappropriate in this setting. For these reasons, we have chosen to model the network problem as a static game. 3 Jia (2007) examines the network decision of both Kmart and Wal-Mart from a strategic perspective, using a full solution method that exploits a lattice representation of the twoplayer problem. However, her elegant, lattice-based solution mechanism comes at a cost, restricting her analysis to only two national players and locations that contain only a single outlet per firm. She notes that, without the latter restriction, her finding of positive chain effects (i.e., density economies) would be less likely to result. In our analysis, we consider the full set of potential locations, allow for any number of competing firms, and place no restrictions on the number of stores per location while controlling for proximity to endogenously placed distribution centers. Aside from finding a strong incentive to cluster around distribution centers, we find no evidence that firms benefit from locating their stores in close proximity to one another -rather, we find strong evidence of own business-stealing.
Our model is most similar to the class of complete information games of strategic behavior (i.e., firms know everything about the forces that drive one another's location decisions).
The usual approach to solving complete information games, however, is not applicable in the setting we consider. In particular, complete information games are typically estimated by solving for each firm's play in every possible equilibrium, and using these predictions to impute behavioral probabilities that can be matched to empirical probabilities. In a high dimension network game, like the one we consider here, there are simply too many potential strategies that each firm might pick to employ this approach. 4 Our approach avoids this difficulty by instead relying on the fact that the observed store configuration chosen by each firm must have dominated the multitude of other options it had. As we demonstrate below, this introduces issues of endogeneity into the estimation that are generally avoided in the typical approach to estimating complete information games. These endogeneity issues 3 A compromise to this fully static approach may be to consider only alternative configurations involving the most recent store placements. We can still allow the locations of older stores to enter into payoffs (and account for the endogeneity of those stores), but only model the decision of where to site stores opened in the past 5 or 10 years. We are currently in the process of obtaining data from previous years in order to accomplish this. 4 For instance, there are 1443 + 1351 − 1 1443 ≈ 10 838 possible ways that Target could choose to distribute its 1443 stores over the 1351 markets in our application.
drive our assumptions about the error structure. 5 In solving this estimation problem, our analysis draws extensively on recent extensions and applications of maximum score. While our pairwise maximum score procedure is based on Fox (2007) , the first stage of our estimation framework is closest in structure to , who consider competitive bidding for packages of mobile phone "spectrum"
licenses. The double differencing procedure used here is also similar to one of the identification strategies used by Pakes, Porter, Ho and Ishii (2006) to eliminate the structural component of the composite error utilized in their moment inequality based approach.
Our results demonstrate the importance of controlling for this structural error. In models that do not control for unobservable attributes of markets, we obtain biased estimates of the competitive and strategic components of firm profits; i.e. the impacts of rival chains and own-chain stores are understated. When we correct for this using our differencing approach, we find that not only do competitors have a strong negative effect on store level profits, but own business stealing effects dominate any incentives to locate multiple outlets of the same chain close to one another. This is in contrast to what has been found elsewhere in the literature. The magnitude of these effects vary by firm. Notably, to offset the presence of a rival firm, Kmart requires an increase in market population that is more than twice the size of the increase required for Wal-Mart. Firm heterogeneity is also evident in their strategies with respect to market demographics, with Target finding high population markets more profitable and Wal-Mart able to maximize profits in less-populated areas.
The interplay between these demographic determinants of profit and the density economies induced by distribution networks have an important impact on spatial competition. To further understand these relationships, we construct a counterfactual scenario in which the effects of distribution networks are removed from the model. We compare the level of retail competition in the resulting equilibrium with the existing equilibrium across markets of varying size. We find that density economies arising from the distribution network lead consumers in small, isolated markets to be underserved by Target, giving Wal-Mart more 5 An alternative approach would be to model our problem as a game of incomplete information, in which there are forces that drive a firm's location decisions that are not observed by that firm's rivals. These games are typically estimated by recovering first-stage predictions of each firm's behavior given the information available to its rivals. One then models the decisions of each firm given these expectations. However, the same combinatorics problems that arise in the complete information approach to the high dimension network game also arise in the incomplete information setting in the process of estimating expectations. market power and the ability to raise prices there.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a model of firm profits as a function of the attributes of markets where they place their stores. We then outline a three-part estimation algorithm used to recover these payoff functions. In the first stage, we estimate the strategic components of store level profits via pairwise maximum score. In the second and third stages, we recover set-valued estimates of the common, market level fixed effect and decompose that fixed effect to estimate the remaining components of firm profits. The data are described in Section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical results, and Section 5 further explores these results by applying them to a counterfactual scenario in which the incentives to cluster around distribution centers are removed. Section 6 concludes.
Model
We focus on the discount store industry. While this segment of retail was once quite fragmented, in the past few decades it has come to be dominated by three main players: WalMart, Kmart, and Target. While each firm is essentially national in scope, there are some fairly obvious distinctions in the types of markets they choose to serve. Some of this is driven by the types of consumers they target. Consistent with its rural beginnings and choice of merchandise, Wal-Mart clearly favors rural locations and smaller cities, avoiding the major cities almost completely (not always by choice). Target, on the other hand, clearly prefers urban locations, consistent with its more "up-market" focus. Finally, Kmart is much less focused, having stores both in major cities and rural towns (which may explain its lackluster performance). In addition to proximity to consumers, location choice is also constrained by logistics -stores have to be stocked with merchandise from a regional distribution center, and so may benefit from being close to that center and close to one another. These economies of density may also come in the form of shared advertising, shared local market knowledge, and managerial spillovers between stores in the same market. All three firms balance these economies of scale and density against the idiosyncratic preferences of individual consumers by designing an optimal network of stores.
In retail industries, location choice essentially dictates the types of consumers you are going to serve, as individuals tend to sort themselves into reasonably homogeneous neigh-borhoods. While such sorting could (and probably does) occur on a very local level, from the researcher's perspective, there is a trade-off between choosing a fine grid and allowing for meaningful correlated unobservables. With this trade-off in mind, we choose Core Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs) as our basic building block. 6 CBSA refers collectively to metropolitan statistical areas and smaller micropolitan statistical areas, which we will call a market or location. Firms choose which locations to enter and how many stores to build in each. While this is somewhat restrictive in that it ignores more nuanced aspects of spatial differentiation, it will allow us to account for correlated, market level, unobservables, which are key to correctly identifying network and congestion effects.
Consistent with the determinants of behavior described above, we model the per-store payoff to firm f = {T, K, W } of each store in market j as:
where N f j is the total number of stores firm f operates in market j, DC f j is the distance from market j to firm f 's nearest distribution center, X j is a vector of exogenous attributes of market j (e.g., income, population, household size, regional dummies), β is a vector of parameters β f,Own , β f,Other , β f,DC , β f,X with β K,X = 0, and θ j is a market-specific fixed effect that is common to all firms. We further define this fixed effect as a combination of observable and unobservable market characteristics:
where ξ j is an unobserved (to the econometrician) attribute of market j (assumed to be scalar, common across firms, and uncorrelated with X j ). Note that γ X X j describes the way in which the X j variables affect Kmart's profits. The impact of X j on Wal-Mart's profits, on the other hand, is represented by (γ X + β W,X )X j , while the effect of X j on Target's profits is found from a comparable expression. The most important strategic parameters are β f,Own , β f,Other , and β f,DC . We expect to find β f,DC < 0 as evidence that costly distribution creates incentives for firms to place stores closer to their distribution centers. β f,Other < 0 indicates that firm f 's profits per store are falling in the number of its competitors' stores in the same location. β f,Own > 0 would indicate that the per-store profit for firm f is increasing in the number of stores it has a particular location (i.e., economies of density), while β f,Own < 0 would suggest that own business stealing effects dominate. 7 Since, ex ante, per-store profits are the same at every store in a given market, total firm level profits are given by summing over these J markets: 8
which is, ultimately, the quantity that firms are maximizing through the choice of N j and the location of distribution centers (which in turn determines DC f j in per-store profits). An important feature of our modeling framework is the inclusion of the unobserved market attribute, ξ j , which serves as our structural error. From a practical standpoint, it is unlikely that our vector of observable market attributes, X j , will capture everything about a market that is important in driving profitability. If we ignore these unobservable characteristics, we will likely arrive at biased estimates of a number of parameters -particularly those associated with N f j . 9 Of course, explicitly including ξ j as part of the error structure creates potential endogeneity problems since N f j is a local attribute that is determined in equilibrium. N f j is, therefore, a direct function of ξ j as well as an indirect function of ξ k ∀ k = j. In solving this problem, we rely on three identification assumptions -in particular, (1) endogenous attributes of each market (i.e., the number of stores of one's own firm, the number of stores of other firms, and the distance to the closest distribution center) are firm specific (i.e., distance to closest Wal-Mart distribution center is relevant only for Wal-Mart stores), (2) the unobserved attribute ξ j is common across firms and additively separable in the profit function, and (3) after controlling for the common unobservable ξ j , 7 β f,Own is properly thought of as capturing the net effect of an additional store on per-store profits. Both positive and negative spillovers may be present between stores of the same chain, but we will not be able to disentangle the two. We also note that even if β f,Own is negative, meaning per store profits are lowered, an additional store may still have an overall positive effect on total firm profits.
8 Note that our model only requires a firm's expectation of the profit at each store in a market to be the same at the time of siting. Profits will likely vary across stores after entry. We need only require that firms cannot predict these deviations. We model the equilibrium locations of all Targets, Wal-Marts, and Kmarts as they appeared in 2006. 11 The locations of each firm's distribution centers are important determinants of these siting decisions, but are certainly not exogenously determined. There is a potentially complicated model of firms' decisions about where to place these distribution centers that we do not attempt to model. Instead, we deal econometrically with the fact that DC f j is endogenous, allowing us to recover unbiased estimates of firm preferences. 12 
Estimation of Strategic, Firm-Specific Parameters
Our estimator is based on a revealed preference approach that uses pairwise comparisons between the observed location decisions made by firms and specific "single-store" deviations. The assumption is that a single-store deviation (i.e., taking a single store and moving it to a new location, holding the location decisions of other firms fixed) is a deviation from the observed Nash equilibrium and is, therefore, payoff reducing for the firm. Recall that the per-store profit of a given firm (say Target) in market j is given by 10 Pakes et al. (2006) employ a similar error decomposition, allowing for one structural error (here, ξj) and one non-structural error. This non-structural, expectational, error arises if firms make decisions based on their beliefs regarding the various components of profits (i.e., the number of consumers or transportation costs), which we do not observe. These beliefs are correct on average, but are subject to well-behaved (i.e., i.i.d) shocks that do not change the firms' ex ante behavior, but yield the observed (but therefore perturbed) covariates that we are conditioning on. A similarly well-behaved "specification error" would work as well.
11 Following the standard practice in the static entry literature, we treat the entire network of each firm as being determined simultaneously in a one-shot game. In contrast, Holmes (2008) models the dynamics of store diffusions, albeit from the perspective of only a single firm. 12 The upside of this approach is that it allows us to recover the role played by distribution centers in the firm entry decision in a very simple framework. The downside of this approach is that it does not allow us to predict new spatial distributions of distribution centers under a counterfactual scenario. We return to this issue below.
Since the per-store profit is the same for every store in a given market, Target's total profit in market j can be written
Note that N W j and N K j are implicitly held at their observed values in V T j N T j , as we only consider unilateral deviations. The logic of the estimator is to consider "swaps" of a single store from one market to another. For example, consider moving a single Target store from market a (e.g., Minneapolis), which currently contains N T a Target stores, to market b (e.g., Chicago), which currently contains N T b Target stores. Since the observed configuration
is part of an equilibrium, Target's total profits must be higher under the observed configuration than under the proposed counterfactual configuration
Note that since all "spillovers" (i.e., congestion effects or economies of density) are assumed to occur within, but not across, markets (i.e., profits are additively separable across markets) the change in total firm profits only depends on the incremental changes associated with the two markets exchanging stores, yielding the following relatively simple inequality
Simplifying this expression yields
where the ∆V f j (·, ·) notation represents the decrease (or increase) in profits associated with removing a single store from (or adding a single store to) a particular market. A difficulty in using this inequality to recover the structural parameters of Target's payoff function is the difference in fixed effects, (θ a − θ b ). In addition to the valuation of the exogenous features of the market which are common to all players (represented here as Kmart's preferences over population, for example), these fixed effects capture the parameters ξ a and ξ b , which are common knowledge of the firms, but unobserved by the econometrician. To obtain unbiased estimates of the profit parameters, we must eliminate these common unobservables from the preference inequality. Therefore, we consider another hypothetical store movement that will allow us to difference these fixed effects away. In particular, consider moving one Kmart store from b to a. This yields an inequality similar to the one above, but with an offsetting difference in the fixed effect term:
Adding Equation (2) to Equation (1) yields another inequality that is free from this problematic term: 13
Using the same logic, we construct many "offsetting" swaps of stores between the three retailers. 14 By considering many such "minor perturbations" to the observed spatial network of stores, we are able to construct a pairwise maximum score objective function with which to estimate the β parameters. (The remaining (common) parameters, γ X , are estimated in a second step.) Because we have explicitly controlled for the structural error in ξ j , we can assume that any remaining idiosyncratic error in Inequality (3) is i.i.d. across markets. Under this assumption, the rank-ordering property defined by Manski (1975) and further described by Fox (2007) is preserved, and we can estimate consistently using only this subset of the almost uncountable number of alternative configurations. Furthermore, Manski (1985) shows that point identification of the β parameters requires a special regressor with continuous support. This covariate essentially serves to break ties between choices and therefore must differ across choices by a sufficient margin. Distance to the 13 It would also have been possible to apply this differencing procedure to inequalities involving a single location, rather than pairs of locations. For example, instead of creating an alternative configuration with one less Target store in location a and one more Target store in location b, we might have considered an alternative with simply one less Target store in location a. This alternative would also be profit-reducing. Then, an offsetting inequality could be generated by adding one Kmart store to location a (also profitreducing for Kmart). When combining the inequalities, the common θa would drop out. The current approach of double-differencing has the (small) advantage of holding the total number of stores fixed.
14 In particular, we randomly select 15,000 pairs of locations (with replacement) from the full set of existing stores. This effectively weights the draws by population, since more populated areas will have more stores. In addition, because there are twice as many Wal-Mart stores as Kmart or Target stores, a higher percentage of the inequalities will involve Wal-Mart-Kmart or Wal-Mart-Target pairings, than will involve Target-Kmart pairings. The choice of 15,000 itself is somewhat arbitrary; similar results were obtained using fewer and using more random pairs.
nearest distribution center, which will always vary across locations and players, is a natural candidate since we only consider switching stores from one market to another. In practice, the non-smoothness of the objective function makes optimization more difficult, so we use a smoothed maximum score objective function with a normal kernel, and bootstrap with sub-sampling to obtain standard errors. 15 We also note that when estimating off these inequalities in a maximum score or smoothed maximum score framework, we must normalize one of the coefficients; for the results presented in Section 4, the coefficient on distance to distribution center is normalized to -1. , DC f j ) in this system. We would expect each of these to be correlated with ξ j (i.e., places that are desirable owing to unobserved factors are likely to have more stores in them, both Own and Other). Locations surrounded by locations with desirable unobservables are, similarly, more likely to be close to a distribution center (assuming distribution centers are placed with the goal of serving a large number of attractive markets). Key to our estimation strategy, ξ j no longer appears in our objective function when it comes time to estimate the parameter vector β. However, the other elements of θ j (apart from ξ j ) are important in giving a meaningful economic interpretation to several of the parameters recovered in the first stage. The common, market specific terms were differenced away. This is an issue in any procedure that involves differencing out common unobservables. An important contribution of our framework lies in the ability to recover these additional parameters, rather than simply differencing them away.
Decomposing the Market Level Fixed Effects
Crucial to our understanding of firm entry behavior is the recovery of the parameters γ X , which are included in θ j , the fixed effect terms that were differenced out of Equation (3).
Recall from above that these parameters describe how the demographic variables included in X j affect Kmart's profits. The impact of X j on Wal-Mart's and Target's profits are represented by (γ X + β W,X )X j and (γ X + β T,X )X j , respectively. Although we have already obtained estimates of β W,X and β T,X in the first stage, we clearly need to know Kmart's values (captured by γ X X j ) in order to determine the overall value that any firm places 15 In practice, we use a simulated annealing algorithm to search for the global optimum.
on an attribute like per-capita income or population density. However, because we were concerned that ξ j would be correlated with all the N 's, we included it in the fixed effect (θ j ) and differenced it out in the first stage. We will now use our first stage estimates, along with an assumption on firm behavior, to recover (set valued) estimates of the fixed effects.
We can then project these interval estimates onto X using Beresteanu and Molinari's (2006) techniques for set valued random variables.
With only three firms and without making explicit distributional assumptions, we are unable to recover point estimates of θ j . There is simply not enough information in data describing the store siting decisions of just three firms to identify the precise values of this many parameters. However, we can recover ranges in which those parameters must lie and then use these intervals to set-identify γ X . In order to do so, we make use of an additional assumption about firm behavior similar to that employed by Pakes, Porter, Ho, and Ishii (2007). In particular, we begin with each firm's marginal profitability of stores in each market j:
Note that we will not attempt to recover the determinants of the number of total stores that each firm builds. This will be affected by capital constraints and cash reserves, long-run business plans, access to foreign suppliers, and so forth. Instead, we assume only that each firm allocated whatever stores it did build in an optimal fashion -that is, they added stores to each market until the marginal profitability of the last store added was equalized across markets. In particular, for each firm f , there is a value c f such that observed marginal profits in each market with at least one store must be greater than c f , while the marginal profits from one additional store must be less than c f :
where β f,X = 0 if f = K. Note that in markets where the firm has zero stores, it is at a corner solution and only Equation (5) must hold. We define the following components of firm f 's marginal profits in market j
Since we have estimated all the β parameters in the first stage (and observe everything else), we can treat this component of marginal profits as known. 16 Because payoffs are only identified up to an additive scale parameter in our discrete choice framework, we have one free normalization. Setting the value of θ j equal to zero for some base location, we have: 17
With these bounds on c f for each firm, we can now use Equations (4 & 5) to bound θ j for each firm:
Assuming that the θ j 's are the same for all firms, the intersection of these bounds describes the set of admissible values that θ j can take for each market j. 18 Note that if we had point estimates of the θ j 's, we could simply project them onto X using a linear regression. However, because the θ j 's are set identified, our dependent variable now comes in interval form: θ j ∈ [θ Lj , θ U j ]. Therefore, we rely on the methods developed by Beresteanu and Molinari (2006), which use a transformed Minkowski average of the data to recover bounds and confidence sets for γ X . Specifically, we estimate the parameters for the best linear predictor of θ in the interval [θ L , θ U ] conditional on X. Suppose X were to consist 16 We will correct for the fact that these are estimates in the second stage standard errors. 17 In practice, the base location used is the Albany, Georgia Metropolitan Area. Kmart, Target, and WalMart each have one store there. The area's population is around the 75th percentile and the population density is close to the median value of all metro and micropolitan areas in our sample.
18 Note that we drop from the θj decomposition exercise forty-six locations where the sets of θj's are disjoint (i.e., where no value of θj can satisfy all three firms inequalities). This is an indication of model mis-specification. Because this only happens with a small fraction of our overall locations, we do not currently make any correction for possible sample selection in the decomposition of θj.
of two variables, x 1 and x 2 . Then the population set-valued best linear predictor is defined
The estimate Γ is obtained by using the sample analogs of the above expectations. The third term in brackets can simply be estimated by 1 J X X −1 , which we will denoteΣ −1 .
The last term in brackets can be written as E(G), where G is a set-valued random variable reflecting all possible values of X θ, given that θ is bounded by θ L and θ U :
The sample analog to this expectation is given by the Minkowski averageḠ J = 1 J J j=1 G j . That is, for each observation j, G j is a line segment with endpoints at (x 1,j θ Lj , x 2,j θ Lj ) and (x 1,j θ U j , x 2,j θ U j ). The Minkowski sum of G j , from j = 1..J, adds all these segments to form a many-sided polygon. Figure 1 illustrates the Minkowski sum of line segments corresponding to ranges of θ for two different markets (in our application, we sum over 912 markets). 
In general, if there are K covariates in X, this estimated set Γ will be a K-dimensional polytope. In our application, the X variables include a constant term and various locationspecific characteristics, such as the natural log of population and median income, the average household size, the percent of the area's population living in urban areas, the population density, and regional dummies. It is computationally difficult (if not impossible)
to Minkowski sum such a high-dimensional set-valued random variable. However, we can estimate a subset of the parameters of the best linear predictor using the same logic as the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell Theorem for partial regression in point-identified models. For example, to estimate the set of possible coefficients on ln(population) and ln(median income), we first obtain the residuals from a linear regression of ln(population) on all other X variables besides ln(median income) and the residuals from a linear regression of ln(median income) on all other X variables besides ln(population). We then denote thesex 1 andx 2 and use them in place of x 1 and x 2 above.
By the same partial regression logic, we can also estimate one-dimensional projections of the identification region. For example, the identification region of the best linear predictor coefficient for a single γ k can be estimated by the interval 19
wherex k,j is the residual from the j th observation in a regression of x k on the other x −k , including the constant term.
For both the one-dimensional and two-dimensional projections, confidence sets can be formed by bootstrapping and computing the Hausdorff distance between the estimated set for the original sample and the estimated set for each bootstrapped sample, H(Γ b ,Γ). 20 Under standard regularity conditions, Beresteanu and Molinari (2006) show that r = √ nH(Γ b ,Γ) is asymptotically normally distributed. Therefore, we can use the 95th percentile of the empirical distribution of r to construct bounds on the collection of all sets that, when specified as the null hypothesis for the true value of the population identification region for Γ, cannot be rejected at a 95% confidence level. This is analogous to forming a 19 This simple result comes from Corollary 4.5 of Beresteanu and Molinari (2006). 20 We account for the estimation error from the first stage by incorporating the bootstrapped estimates of β when forming the intervals for θj.
95% confidence interval for a point estimate.
Data
The data for the discount store industry are taken primarily from Trade Dimension's Retail Tenant Database for 2006. This proprietary dataset contains all 6,150 Wal-Mart, Kmart, and Target stores in operation in the continental United States as of August 2006. These include both pure discount stores that carry general merchandise and newer supercenter formats that also carry full grocery lines. 21 Because of the additional difficulty in modeling a firm's choice of store format, we do not distinguish between these two types of stores in our current application.
Stores are assigned to markets based on the county in which they are located. Where possible, 22 adjacent counties are grouped together into single markets according to the 2005 Census definitions for Core Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs), a term that refers collectively to metropolitan statistical areas and smaller micropolitan statistical areas. These statistical areas contain from one to twenty-eight counties (on average, 1.9 counties) and include both a core urban area and any adjacent counties that are closely linked economically and socially.
Metro areas are those with a core urban area with a population of at least 50,000, and micro areas are those with a core urban area with a population from 10,000 to 50,000. Figure 2 illustrates the locations of all the retail stores in our data set, along with all of the larger metropolitan CBSA's. We believe that using CBSA's to define markets is more appropriate than using counties alone since they typically define a more natural "shopping area" by grouping interrelated counties together. The same criticism that applies to using large counties (e.g., Los Angeles County) to measure markets also applies here -all stores in the largest metro areas probably do not compete equally with one another. However, this broad market definition allows us to capture any positive supply-side spillovers that may potentially occur between stores of the same chain located in the same MSA.
We have collected demographic and economic data on each market from the U.S. Census 21 We exclude Sam's Club stores, owned by Wal-Mart, because these warehouse clubs do not compete directly with Kmart and Target stores. Furthermore, they are served by separate distribution facilities from those that serve Wal-Mart stores. 22 A total of 439 counties with discount stores are relatively isolated and are not included as part of any Census-defined CBSA. These counties are included as individual markets in our estimation. In addition to these local characteristics, an important determinant of a firm's store location choice is the distance to suppliers, so a unique feature of our data is the availability of detailed information about distribution centers. The Trade Dimensions database contains the locations of each of the 113 distribution centers that serve the stores in our analysis.
Wal-Mart is vertically-integrated, owning all 70 distribution centers that supply its stores.
Kmart and Target operate most of the distribution centers that supply their stores, 13
and 24 centers, respectively. However, a small number of their stores rely on third-party distributors. We include the locations of one Merchants Distributors center and five SuperValu distribution centers that serve Kmart and Target stores, respectively. Using the Haversine formula, we calculate the distance from the population-weighted centroid of each market to the county of the closest distribution center for each firm. Figure 3 illustrates the locations of all stores and distribution centers in the upper Midwest. Target tends to place distribution centers close to large cities, which is consistent with supporting its generally accepted upscale, urban focus. Wal-Mart, on the other hand, places its distribution centers so as to best be able to serve stores which are themselves located between major markets.
The picture highlights the differing strategies of the two firms, which will be evident in our estimation results. 23 Summary statistics for these markets are provided in Tables 7 and 8 Wal-Mart has a presence in 97% of the markets, compared to 44% and 26% of the markets for Kmart and Target, respectively. In part, this is expected because there are twice as many Wal-Mart stores included in the data (3345) as there are Kmart or Target stores (1362 and 1443, respectively). However, it also appears that these firms follow quite different strategies when locating stores. This can especially be seen in Table 8 Figure 4 shows the total number of discount stores versus population for all 1351 markets.
Not surprisingly, the relationship is linear, and fairly tightly clustered around the regression line for low values of population. There is also obvious heteroskedasticity: the variance in the number of stores increases with population, as differences in land prices and zoning restrictions become more pronounced. This latter effect is why we need to control for market level unobservables; some markets are able to physically fit more stores (e.g., Dallas), while others are not (e.g., New York City).
Results
Our main empirical results are presented in Tables 1 and 2 for several alternative specifications of the model. Table 1 reports the parameters for the firm-specific components of per-store profits, which were estimated in the first stage of our two-step procedure. The results from the second stage procedure are presented in Table 2 . Focusing first on the results from the first stage, several features are worth noting.
First, with respect to density economies, the negative coefficients on distance to distribution centers indicate that there are clear density economies induced by the distribution network. That is, all three firms exhibit a distaste for being far from their distribution centers. 25 Second, in all of our specifications, we find clear evidence of the congestive effect of competition both among rival firms (β f,Other < 0) and among stores owned by the same firm due to own-business stealing (β f,Own < 0). While the competition effect is to be expected, the dominance of the business stealing effect over local density economies unrelated to distribution is somewhat surprising given the results reported by both Jia (2007) and Holmes (2008) . At least two factors are likely to be in play here. First, we consider larger markets than either Jia (2007) or Holmes (2008) , and these markets contain many more stores. Therefore, the chain/business stealing effect we are finding is occurring within markets, as opposed to across markets. Cannibalization within markets is likely to be much stronger than cannibalization across markets. Second, we have included a market level fixed effect that accounts for unobserved market features that are likely to be correlated with the Maximum score estimation requires the normalization of one parameter. In all models shown here, the coefficient on distance to a store's closest distribution center is normalized to -1. The standard errors reported in italics are preliminary, pending the estimation of a larger number of bootstrapped samples. † In this specification, the coefficients on ln(Median Income) and ln(Population) were constrained to be equal in order to capture a rough measure of market size. ‡ These common components of the profit function are differenced out as part of the location fixed effect. They are estimated in a separate second stage, the results of which are reported in Table 2 . In Specification V, because we have dropped the unobservable location-specific characteristic, there is no need to use the differencing approach; all parameters can be recovered in a single stage.
clustering of stores. 26 Column V, which contains the results from a specification in which the market level fixed effects are dropped, 27 illustrates the consequences of ignoring this heterogeneity. As expected, both the competition and business stealing results are biased towards zero, as own and rival stores are now proxying for unobserved spikes in the relative desirability of particular markets. Nonetheless, we still do not find agglomeration/chain effects. 28 The importance of the unobservable characteristic can also be seen by comparing the value of the score function under the different specifications. When the unobservable coefficient is excluded in Column V, the estimator correctly matches approximately 71% of the sampled inequalities. This score jumps to 93% when the unobservable is included in Columns I-IV. We also note that the models which include more of the location-specific covariates have slightly higher scores, as expected.
These own and rival effects also shed light on the relative strengths and weaknesses of each firm. By comparing the magnitude of these coefficients, it appears that Kmart suffers the most from the introduction of a rival firm in the same market, while the impact of rival stores on own-store profits is lowest for Wal-Mart. This indicates that Wal-Mart is the most able to insulate itself from competition. In fact, the impact of an additional store on per-store profit is almost the same whether the entrant is a competing chain or another Wal- An attractive feature of our model is that it allows firms to profit differently from observable characteristics of the market. Target, which is located primarily in metropolitan areas, has the strongest preference for population relative to both Kmart and Wal-Mart, while Wal-Mart has the weakest. This is consistent with conventional wisdom regarding each firm's preferred demographic. Other socio-demographic characteristics (i.e., median income, average household size, percent urban) are generally insignificant. Restricting the coefficients on ln(population) and ln(median income) to be the same (i.e., turning them into a measure of "market size"), we do find a significant effect that is most valued by Target and least valued by Wal-Mart. 31
The second stage estimates are reported in Table 2 . The bounds and 95% confidence sets for the coefficient for log population are positive in all our specifications, indicating, as expected, that larger markets are more profitable. We also note that, while the firststage estimates indicate Wal-Mart's profitability from population is lower than Kmart's or Target's, the net effect (captured by γ pop + β W,pop ) is still positive. The set estimates for the other market characteristics are generally neutral; that is, they cover both positive and negative values. It is therefore difficult to draw conclusions about Kmart's location preferences, after controlling for the impact of high values of population.
Given the relevance of population for determining the optimal location strategy, it is important to note that without the set estimation techniques used in this stage to separately identify the effects of the observable and unobservable market attributes, we would obtain very biased estimates of its effect. For instance, if we fail to control for unobservable characteristics and instead estimate the impact of population on profits directly in a single stage, we obtain a coefficient on population of 18.31 for Kmart (see Column V of Table   1 ). However, when we properly control for unobservables, the effect ranges from 132.8 to 228.6 -roughly 7 to 12 times larger. The effects on Wal-Mart's and Target's per-store 30 These calculations are based on a market with the median population of 74,150 and use the midpoint of the interval γ ln(pop) estimated in the second stage. 31 Other specifications not reported here included measures of population density and total retail sales as a measure of market size. The results showed a similar pattern, but these coefficients were usually insignificant. profits are similarly understated when we exclude ξ j . 32 Firms profit greatly from increases in market size, but by failing to control for unattractive unobservables, such as expensive land or zoning restrictions in New York City and other high population areas, market size appears to be a much less compelling force in store location decisions.
Counterfactuals
Because we did not explicitly model the decisions of discount retailers about how many distribution centers to build and where to place them, we are limited in the counterfactual scenarios that we can consider. In particular, we are constrained to consider either (1) small variations under which it would be reasonable to hold the number and location of distribution centers fixed, or (2) the situation in which distance to the distribution center is not a factor in firms' payoffs. The former is useful for discerning the role of particular local attributes in firms' decisions. The latter is useful for discerning the role of distribution costs in determining the spatial distribution of retail centers. This may have important implications for pricing -some locations may face little competition because of their isolation from other markets, leading consumers there to face higher prices.
In our simulation, we ascribe to each firm the value of c f at the mid-point of its range of possible values, and then solve for the values of θ j for each firm so that the vector of equations described by (4) holds with equality. We then "turn off" the density economies generated by proximity to distribution centers (i.e., we set ln(DC f ) = 0∀f ) and solve for the new vector of equilibrium store counts. For this exercise, we relax the natural requirement that store counts take on integer values, and instead we solve for N f j as a real number. We interpret this as a probability or expected number of stores in each market. 33 We then compare this new equilibrium to the one observed in the data in terms of concentration by calculating the difference in the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI). An index comprised of only these 32 For example, when we combine the set estimates of the common population coefficient from Table 2 with the firm-specific coefficients found in Stage 1 (reported in Column IV of Table 1 ), the net effect of log population on Target's profit ranges from 150.8 to 239.0, which is six to nine times larger than the estimate of 25.72 found when ξj is excluded in Column V.
33 There is no reason to expect this equilibrium to be unique. We select an equilibrium by looking for that which is "closest" to the equilibrium that was actually played. We do this by beginning with the store counts in the observed equilibrium. We then change store counts marginally until we arrive at a new equilibrium with the distance to the nearest distribution center set at 0 for all firms. three firms would overstate the level of concentration since these major retailers face some degree of competition from independent "Mom-and-Pop" retailers as well as supermarkets, office supply stores, electronics stores, and other big-box retailers (not specifically included in our model). Therefore, when constructing our measure of HHI, we allow for a set of fringe firms to account for 40% of the sales in each market and allocate the remaining 60% among Kmart, Wal-Mart, and Target based on the number of stores they each operate. 34,35 ‡ The HHI is calculated allowing for a set of fringe firms to account for 40% of the market, while Wal-Mart, Kmart, Target, and Wal-Mart divide the remaining 60% according to the number of stores they each operate. We hold this fringe fixed when computing the HHI under the counterfactual scenario. The number of firms that comprise this fringe will affect the level of the index, but not the change. Table 3 describes the store count and change in concentration in an illustrative set of markets. A clear trend emerges. Adding in density economies (i.e., moving from right to left across Table 3 ) increases concentration in smaller markets while it reduces it in large markets. Table 4 makes the same point using all markets. In the smallest quintile of markets, eliminating density economies reduces concentration (at least slightly) in 264
34 For example, if Target and Wal-Mart each operate one store in a given market, they would each be assigned a 30% market share. The percentage allocated to a competitive fringe was chosen as 40% because Wal-Mart, Kmart, and Target account for 73% of national sales in the discount retail sector; we lower this number to 60% for our purposes because they face competition outside what is typically included in that sector. Adjusting this percentage does not greatly affect the results.
35 Without additional data, it is a necessary simplification to assume that the fringe accounts for the same total share in all markets and that it remains fixed under the counterfactual scenario. of 270 cases. The opposite is true in the quintile containing the largest markets, where almost 60% of the markets become more concentrated. The magnitude of these changes are somewhat small; however we note that even changes in the concentration index of 50 or 100 points may be considered significant in already concentrated industries. 36 Of the 1056 markets for which the presence of density economies implies an increase in concentration, the change in HHI exceeds 50 points in 42% of them. Table 5 explores the reasons for this differential effect by breaking down the counterfactual response by firm and market size. The most striking result is that, without the constraints of density economies, Target is free to enter smaller markets at a disproportionate rate relative to Wal-Mart. Specifically, Target adds stores in the smallest quintile of markets (where it originally had none), and in the second smallest quintile (where it had only seven stores in the original configuration) Target increases the number of its stores by 36 According to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines developed by the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice, changes in the concentration index of 50 points in highly concentrated industries (HHIs above 1800) "potentially raise significant competitive concerns," depending on additional factors like efficiencies and barriers to entry. In many of the markets we consider, the changes in HHI and their initial levels would pass this threshold. 29 percent. In those same markets, Wal-Mart increases the number of its stores by less than 3 percent. The implication is that density economies arising from the distribution network keep Target (which generally prefers to serve large, urban markets) from competing with Wal-Mart in small, isolated markets. Currently, Target (and to some extent Kmart) is likely to enter these small markets only if they are close to larger markets and can be served by the same distribution center. The result is that Wal-Mart faces less pressure from Target and Kmart to lower prices for consumers in rural markets. 37 Table 6 elaborates on these points by regressing the change in HHI when density economies are removed on market attributes. The smallest markets become less concentrated on average and witness the largest decrease in HHI (alternatively, they see the biggest increase in HHI when density economies are put back into the model). This effect is compounded for small markets in the West (where they are generally more dispersed) -see Column II. The role played by density economies in Target's decisions is particularly evident in Column III, which indicates that markets far from its existing distribution centers become less concentrated when distribution costs are removed from the model.
Conclusions
Many of the most important sectors in the U.S. economy are characterized by a small number of firms making many interlinked entry decisions over a large choice set (i.e., a high-dimension network game). This market structure creates considerable difficulty for the economic modeling of entry behavior. In particular, the large number of possible configurations available to firms rules out using the traditional approaches (assuming either complete or incomplete information) to modeling games. In this paper, we propose an alternative approach based on revealed preference inequalities. Basing identification only on the premise that the firm chose its best possible configuration (given the equilibrium play of its rivals), this approach avoids ever having to solve for an equilibrium. Nor does it ever require that we solve for the probability of seeing each of an almost uncountable number of configurations. Implementing this estimator is complicated by the fact that we need to control for the effect on entry of market attributes, many of which are unobserved. We 37 Whether consumers currently face lower prices for various goods than they would in the absence of Wal-Mart (i.e., relying only on local retailers) is a question to be taken up in another analysis. show how this can be accomplished by using the logic of a difference-in-differences estimator nested inside our revealed preference inequalities.
In implementing this approach, we find strong evidence that strategic behavior and the proximity to the distribution network drives entry decisions, but find no evidence that firms benefit directly by locating their stores near one another at the margin -i.e., own business stealing effects are significant and dominate any gains from shared advertising, managerial spillovers, or other agglomeration benefits between nearby stores operated by the same firm. The magnitude of these effects vary by firm, with Kmart suffering the most from competition with rivals. Interestingly, per store profits for a Wal-Mart store are hurt just as much by the presence of a rival as by the presence of another Wal-Mart store, suggesting that the firm has reached a saturation point. Allowing for such firm heterogeneity in profits also highlights the different strategies Wal-Mart, Kmart, and Target pursue with respect to observable market demographics.
We also contend that it is important for our model to be able to distinguish the separate effects of observable and unobservable market attributes in driving entry behavior. Whereas most of the problems we encounter arise because of the large choice set available to firms, determining these separate effects is made more complicated because of the small number of firms we observe. In particular, we are required to use new theory for estimation with set-valued random variables developed by Beresteanu and Molinari (2006) . Doing so,
we find that population is the primary observable determinant of discount retail entry behavior, but it cannot explain everything. A variety of other factors (e.g., land prices, zoning restrictions) are clearly important for entry decisions, but are unobserved by the econometrician. Without the techniques we use for separately identifying their effects, we obtain very biased estimates of the role of population in the entry decision. The alternative approach of estimating the common firm preferences for population directly in the first stage requires omitting the unobservable location attributes entirely. Not only does this bias estimates of the competitive and business stealing effects, but it also underestimates the population parameters. The net effects in Column V of Table 1 are seven times smaller than the population estimates recovered from the two-step approach. Firms care strongly about population, but unattractive unobservables (e.g., expensive land in New York City) makes market size appear to be a much less compelling force in store location decisions.
Finally, one of the main reasons for estimating a structural model is that it allows the researcher to make counterfactual predictions. Given recent interest in the role of economies of density in firm location, we ask how entry behavior would have differed had firms not been constrained by the costs of accessing their distribution centers. From this experiment, we learn how distribution costs differentially affect the level of competition faced by consumers in large and small markets. Carrying out this exercise revealed two important facts. First, it is straightforward to simulate new equilibria of a large network game using our modeling approach. The only previous attempt to do so was Jia (2007) , and her model required restrictive assumptions (which we reject) about both the number of firms and the presence of strategic complementarities. Second, we find that economies from locating stores near to the firm's distribution center -while beneficial in reducing the firm's costs -might actually have detrimental effects on the welfare of consumers in small, isolated markets. This is a clear distributional result. Whether density economies enhance or detract from social welfare is a more complicated question that requires accounting for all of their welfare effects on consumers and their impacts on firm profits, issues that cannot be addressed by our current dataset. Future work will also look at more complex counterfactual scenarios that allow firms to reoptimize the placement of their distribution centers. To do so, we can use similar estimation techniques employed here to understand capacity constraints and other factors that determine current distribution center locations.
We conclude by noting two limitations of our analysis (or, alternatively, opportunities for future research). First, we model entry behavior as a static game. Given the issues described above, this is a challenging exercise, but it is clearly unrealistic given the time frame over which Target, Kmart, and Wal-Mart built their stores. Adding dynamics while maintaining our full strategic environment, focus on distribution network, and choice set definition poses serious challenges. Second, we are forced to restrict our structural errors to only allow for a market level unobservable that is common across all firms. It would be desirable to allow firms to have heterogeneous preferences for market features that are unobserved by the econometrician. Doing so in the present context would, however, invalidate our "double difference" approach to handling market level unobservables.
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